Abstract: Pro t on proprietary research tools is determined partly by the remedies for infringement, such as damages and injunctions. We investigate how damages under a liability rule and the opportunity for injunctions under a property rule can a ect the incentives to develop research tools. We show that the prevailing legal doctrine of damages under the liability rule, called lost pro t or reasonable royalty, su ers from a logical circularity which leads to an indeterminacy in permissible damages. This can create insu cient incentives to develop research tools. Incentives can be improved either by a property rule with injunctions or by a liability rule under the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
Introduction
Intellectual property is usually conceived as protecting commodities in the end-user market. In modern industries such as biotechnology, another type of proprietary invention has become the focus of much controversy and litigation, namely, technologies which have no direct commercial value to end users, but are inputs to developing such commodities. We will refer to such inventions as research tools or enabling technologies. Examples include the Cohen-Boyer patent on the technology for inserting foreign genetic material into bacteria, the Genentech patent on a technology for getting foreign genes to express, the PCR technology for replicating DNA in test tubes, gene guns, and recent suppression technologies that cause gene sequences to become inactive. Since research tools are not sold to consumers, the traditional analysis of intellectual property does not apply. The pro t on research tools comes from licensing and pro t-sharing arrangements with rms that want to use the research tools to create other products. Pro t-sharing agreements may take the form of licensing contracts, research joint ventures, and mergers. We observe all three types of arrangements in the biotechnology industry.
The value of any i n tellectual property depends on how easily it can be enforced. The latter depends both on the costs of litigation and on the remedies for infringement. For products sold to consumers, the remedy can be money damages or an injunction to stop selling the infringing product in the market. Infringement of a research tool has another remedy: an injunction against developing the product, rather than against marketing it. In legal parlance, the di erence between damages and injunctions is the di erence between a liability rule and a property rule. An economist's instinct is that the threat of damages should beenough to enforce intellectual property rights, and that injunctions are unnecessary. 4 However, this view 4 In fact there is very little economics literature on injunctions. Lanjouw and Lerner 1996 study how rms can use preliminary injunctions to force favorable settlement terms when litigation costs are asymmetric, and present some supporting evidence. A preliminary injunction stops alleged infringement during the trial, whereas a permanent injunction which w e study in this paper occurs after infringement is found, and holds for the life of the patent unless the rms contract around it. Aggarwal 1998 1 was contradicted in several interviews we conducted with patent counsel and CEOs of biotechnology rms, who viewed injunctions as an indispensable tool in protecting their intellectual property. In this paper we i n vestigate whether appropriately chosen damages can obviate the need for injunctions, and whether such damages are consistent with the legal doctrines on which they are based, namely, the currently favored doctrine of lost pro t reasonable royalty and the less used doctrine of unjust enrichment.
Both the right to collect damages and the right to enjoin an infringing research program are constrained by the doctrine of laches. A failure to make a timely e ort to stop infringement can nullify the right to recover damages or to enjoin infringement. After an infringement begins, delay is pro table to the patentholder because delay increases the cost that the infringer has sunk when the rms nally negotiate a settlement. Our analysis not only sheds light on how injunctions can improve on damages as a remedy to infringement, but also provides guidance on how m uch delay should be allowed before the defense of laches can beinvoked.
Our main conclusions are as follows:
There is a basic circularity of reasoning that a icts the lost pro ts reasonable royalty doctrine of damages. On one hand, prospective damages determine the pro tability of licensing, and on the other hand, the pro tability of licensing hence lost pro ts in case of infringement determine damages. Because of this circularity, a wide range of damage measures are consistent with the doctrine. Low damages, but not damages high enough to deter infringement, are consistent with it.
Injunctive relief can improve the incentives to develop research tools under most interpretations of the lost pro t reasonable royalty rule. However, injunctions are not an improvement if they must beinvoked too soon before the infringer has sunk any costs or too late so that the potential infringer, anticipating an unfavorable settlement after the injunction, will be deterred from infringement. discusses how damages interact with litigation costs.
Injunctive relief cannot improve on damages under the unjust enrichment doctrine of damages.
Under a liability rule, the unjust enrichment doctrine of damages provides greater incentives for developing research tools than the lost pro t reasonable royalty d o ctrine.
A unifying theme in these conclusions is that, if the goal is to increase the pro tability of the research tool, then remedies for infringement either damages under a liability rule or injunction and settlement under a property rule should not be so stringent that infringement would bedeterred in the absence of an ex ante license. Infringement of the research tool is pro table to the patentholder because the infringer must either pay high damages ex post under the liability rule or is forced into an ex post negotiation when part of his costs have been sunk under the property rule. If infringement is deterred, then the owner of the research tool must negotiate an ex ante license before any of the development costs have been sunk. The bargaining assumption that underlies these conclusions is that the rms share the whole bargaining stake when they strike the bargain, namely, the value of the product net of the costs that have not been sunk. 5 In Section 2 we present a stylized model in which a rm rm 1 has developed a proprietary research tool, which is an input for second-generation products. Either rm 1 or another rm rm 2 can develop a product with commercial value using the research tool, but the development process is itself an infringement. Section 2 investigates the liability rule, where the only remedy for infringement is damages. In Section 3 we discuss the legal doctrines of damages that apply in the U.S., and examine which doctrine creates greater incentives for developing research tools. Section 4 analyzes a property rule, where the rms can seek injunctive relief. We also discuss the doctrine of laches, and how it constrains strategic timing of injunctions. In Section 5 we show how the model is modi ed if there are nonproprietary alternatives to the research tool.
Our model has the cumulative features of Scotchmer 1991, and Green and Scotchmer 1995, but we focus on di erent issues. They investigated the division of pro t between sequential innovators, where the second innovation might or might not infringe the rst patent, and discussed how patent breadth the probability of infringement affects the terms of licensing. For research tools, any unauthorized use of the proprietary tool is an infringement. The division of pro t is mainly governed by the remedies for infringement, in particular, the legal theory of damages and the possibility of injunction.
The perspective taken here is that intellectual property rights are not exercised as the right to exclude, but as the right to collect licensing fees by threatening to exclude under a property rule or by threatening to collect damages under a liability rule. Provided the owner of the research tool can collect licensing fees, he can pro t by encouraging other rms to use the tool in developing products. The rules for enforcing intellectual property rights set the threat points for licensing agreements, and hence the division of pro ts. With frictionless licensing, intellectual property will not sti e the development of second-generation products. This is a di erent perspective than is often taken by legal scholars such as Eisenberg 1989 , and Heller and Eisenberg 1998, who are less optimistic about contracting, and want to ensure that inventions are put to good use even when contracting fails. Injunctions can foreclose the use of research tools when licensing fails, and for this reason Eisenberg argues against giving patent holders injunctive relief for research tools. Instead she proposes that courts impose damages equal to reasonable royalty p a yments. 6 Merges 1996 takes a di erent position, arguing that to exclude injunctive relief and to rely exclusively on damage remedies would put an unmanageable burden on the courts to set damages or compulsory licensing fees in a way that serves the public interest. This 6 She discusses the relative merits of property and liability rules in the context of the experimental use exception in patent l a w. It remains unclear how broadly U.S. courts will grant this exception. In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co. 733 F.2d 858 1983, the Federal Circuit ruled that the experimental use exception did not protect the use by generic drug manufacturers of a patented drug for testing to meet FDA drug approval requirements. This was overruled through legislation by problem can beavoided by permitting injunctions. We also argue that a property rule can besuperior to a liability rule, but for a di erent reason. Since damages consistent with the prevailing doctrine can be too low, the threat of injunction can improve the rst patentholder's bargaining position, and improve the incentive to develop research tools.
Analysis of the Liability Rule Damages
We rst describe the model, and then analyze how damages a ect the research tool owner's pro t under a liability rule. In Section 3 we discuss what damages are consistent with legal doctrines.
We assume there are two rms, i = 1 ; 2, and that a research tool has been patented by rm 1. Either rm can develop a particular product using this tool, and the rms' R&D costs are respectively c 1; c 2 , observable to both rms. The pro t available by achieving the product is v. We assume throughout that minfc 1 ; c 2 g v, so that the rms will want t o i n vest. We assume that unauthorized use of the research tool is an infringement, and that if development of a product was not authorized by a license, then marketing the product is also an infringement.
The premise of our analysis is that it is desirable to transfer the entire pro t surplus of the product to the owner of the research tool, where the pro t surplus is maxfv , c 1 ; v , c 2 g. Once the research tool is invented, it is in the interest of the owner not to jeopardize its use in creating new products. The owner will license on terms that the users will accept, since it is better to license at a low price than not to license at all. This places a natural constraint on how much pro t can becollected from users of the research tool it cannot belarger than the pro t surplus, and ensures that the tool is used to develop all new products whose pro t surplus is nonnegative. For the research tool itself, there is no guarantee that the inventor's costs will be covered, and that is why it is desirable to maximize his pro t, subject to the self-imposed constraint that the second generation products are not jeopardized.
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The order of decisions is shown in Figures 1 and 2 for two cases: rst, that rm 1 has a pure research tool and no expertise or very high costs c 1 t o d e v elop the product, and second, that the owner of the research tool might compete with rm 2 in development of the product, or even preempt rm 2 entirely. 7 Development of the product by rm 2 is an infringement of the research tool, and the rms must either license ex ante or resolve the infringement issue ex post, after the product has been developed. The prospect of resolving the infringement ex post sets the bargaining positions for the ex ante agreement. The considerations relevant to equilibrium pro t in both cases are summarized in Table 1 .
We assume that in equilibrium the rms will bargain ex ante to an e cient outcome. This means that the product will be developed if and only if it adds to joint pro t, and that the most e cient lowest cost rm will invest. In addition, an ine cient patent race will be avoided. The role of damages and other aspects of intellectual property is that damages determine the threat points for the rms' ex ante bargain. For example, the prospective damages determine whether an unlicensed rm has an incentive to race and then pay damages if it wins. The attractiveness of racing without a license will determine the terms of the license.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that whenever rms make a bargain, they share the bargaining surplus in shares ; 1 , . To determine the rm's equilibrium pro t, the bargaining share is added to the rm's threat point. If the rms have symmetric bargaining positions, then it is natural to assume = 1=2, as in the Nash bargaining solution. The threat points, bargaining surplus and equilibrium pro ts are listed in Table 1 for the cases summarized in Figures 1 and 2 . 7 According to our interviews, vertical integration of life sciences rms and plant biology rms is increasing. In addition, some biotechnology products naturally play a dual role as research tool and product, e.g., the genetic sequence for a hepatitus C inhibitor, which is both the basis for a diagnostic product, and a research tool for developing a vaccine. 6 
Pure Research Tools
In Cases 1a and 1b, described by Figure 1 , we assume that c 1 is very high c 1 v , so that rm 1 would not invest in the product even if rm 2 failed to invest. Instead he will license to rm 2. 8 In Case 1a, damages d are relatively small small enough so that rm 2 would make non-negative pro t even if it were caught infringing and paid damages. In Case 1b, damages d are assumed large enough so that rm 2 will not invest without an ex ante agreement.
Either rm can refuse an ex ante license. Refusal of either rm leads the two of them down the right branch of Figure 1 . If rm 2 then invests without an ex ante license, knowing that its research hence product will infringe, rm 2 will be charged the damages d if it patents or commercializes the product. Patenting or commercialization involves disclosure, and the infringement i s t h us revealed.
For completeness, in the rightmost branch after patent?, we investigate whether rm 2 can avoid these damages by threatening to keep the invention secret in order to enhance its ex post bargaining position. If rm 2 tried to license ex post for smaller license fees than d, rm 1 would refuse the ex post settlement, knowing that it is more pro table for rm 2 to commercialize and pay damages d provided v ,c 2 ,d 0 than to carry out the threat of keeping the invention secret.
Thus, the pro ts that accrue without an ex ante license are d; v , c 2 , d, and these threat points are also the equilibrium pro ts with an ex ante agreement when damages d are relatively small because there is no further e ciency gain to be shared. This is shown in Table 1 , Case 1a.
However if damages for infringement are relatively high, speci cally, i f v ,c 2 ,d 0, then rm 2 would end up with negative pro t, absent an ex ante agreement. The righthand branch will not befollowed, and an ex ante agreement is necessary to elicit investment. The e ciency surplus to be shared in the ex ante agreement i s v ,c 2 ; which leads to the equilibrium pro ts v , c 2 ; 1 , v , c 2 shown in Table 1 The proposition states how damages d should be set in order to maximize the incentive t o d e v elop the research tool. As mentioned above, a consequence of e cient e x a n te agreements is that high prospective damages d will not sti e use of the research tool. 
Vertically Integrated Firms
Cases 2 and 3 in Table 1 describe the circumstance where the rst patent holder not only owns the proprietary research tool, but also has expertise to develop the downstream product. The di erent cases in Table 1 re ect di erent combinations of fv;c 1 ; c 2 ; d g.
Even if rm 1 has expertise to develop the product v c 1 , it prefers to delegate to rm 2 if rm 2 is more e cient c 1 c 2 . Whether or not rm 1 wants to delegate, rm 2 has the option to infringe the patent and force an ex post settlement in which rm 2 pays damages d to rm 1. If damages d are relatively low, this threat constrains rm 1's ability to pro t from its research tool.
The bargaining surpluses in Table 1 are derived from three sources: by ensuring that the product is invented when otherwise it would not be Case 1b; by allowing the rms to avoid the cost-duplication of a patent race Case 2; and by allowing the rms to delegate research e ort to the lowest-cost rm Cases 3a and 3b.
Since threat points for the ex ante agreement are set by reference to what would happen otherwise, we must know what would happen in a patent race. A race will never happen in equilibrium, because it duplicates costs. However, the prospect of an ine cient race sets the rms' threat points for the license in Case 2. We assume that if the rms race, each wins with probability one-half. If rm 2 is the winner, then it pays damages d to rm 1 in an ex post settlement of the infringement. Thus rm 2 will race if its expected pro t, v , d=2 , c 2 , is greater than zero, and rm 1 will race if its expected pro t, v + d=2 ,c 1 , is greater than its payo for not racing, which i s d. Thus the rms will race if v , 2c 1 d and v , 2c 2 d , shown in Table 1 .
A complication arises when the race has room for only one rm. Suppose that either rm can make pro t alone v c 1 and v 2 ,c 2 d , but neither can make positive pro t if they race. There can betwo equilibria, one in which the lowcost rm invests and another in which the high-cost rm invests. The ex ante agreement depends on the rms' joint conjecture about who would invest, absent a n e x a n te license. If the e cient rm would invest, there is no bargaining surplus to be shared. If the ine cient rm would invest, then the surplus to be shared ex ante is the saved cost, e.g., c 2 , c 1 if rm 2 i s t h e ine cient rm.
The equilibrium pro ts of rm 1 derived in Table 1 are summarized in Figures 3 and  4 . Figure 3 depicts the cases where the low-cost rm would invest, absent an ex ante agreement the low-cost rm can either be rm 1 or rm 2: Figure 4 depicts the cases where the high-cost rm would invest. There are two striking features of Figures 3 and 4 . First, rm 1's pro t is never monotonic in damages d. It drops discontinuously at values of d where damages have become so large that one of the rms would no longer race. Second, there is no guarantee that damages will allow appropriation of the full surplus by rm 1. The next section shows how appropriation depends on the legal doctrine of damages.
We summarize the important parts of Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4 
i Suppose that damages under a liability rule satisfy d minfv , 2c 1 ; v , 2c 2 g, so that the rms would race, absent an ex ante license. Then less than the full pro t surplus is transferred t o r m 1 i n a n ex ante agreement.
ii Suppose that, absent an ex ante agreement, the higher-cost ine cient rm would invest in the product. Then under a liability rule, even if the rms form an ex ante agreement, there is no damage d that results in rm 1 collecting the full pro t surplus.
iii Suppose that, absent a n e x a n te agreement, the lower-cost e cient rm would invest in the product. Then by setting d = minfv ,c 1 ; v ,c 2 g damages under a liability rule are equal to the full pro t surplus, all the pro t is transferred to rm 1.
Proof. i Firm 2's equilibrium pro t is its threat point, v + d=2 , c 1 , plus its bargaining share of the cost saving, 1 , maxf c 1 , c 2 g. Both are positive, so rm 2 makes positive equilibrium pro t. Since the pro t of rm 1 and rm 2 sum to the pro t surplus, maxfv , c 1 ; v , c 2 g; it follows that rm 1 does not collect the full surplus.
ii Whether the ine cient rm is rm 1 or rm 2, there is a positive bargaining surplus to divide in the ex ante agreement, namely, maxfc 1 , c 2 ; c 2 , c 1 g: Hence rm 2 earns positive pro t, and as in i, not all the surplus is transferred to rm 1.
iii If rm 1 is the more e cient rm, then v , c 1 = d v , c 2 ; so rm 2 plays no role. Firm 1 invests and receives the surplus. If rm 2 is the more e cient rm, then d = v , c 2 , and all the surplus is transferred to rm 1 as a damage settlement, if not as an ex ante license. Proposition 2.3 shows that it may not bepossible for the developer of the research tool to appropriate the full surplus through the use of only one instrument, damages, even when rms strike ex ante licenses in the shadow of such damages. In the next section we discuss whether full appropriation by the research tool owner is consistent with the prevailing legal doctrines. We then consider whether full appropriation can be achieved with another instrument, injunctive relief.
Legal Doctrines of Damages under the Liability Rule
In this section we discuss the legal doctrines of damages for patent infringement i n the United States, and interpret them for our model. We identify a basic logical circularity in the prevailing legal doctrine of damages, and argue that this circularity reduces the e cacy of damages in enforcing intellectual property rights for research tools. We analyze the case where the tool owner earns revenue only by licensing to other rms Case 1 in Table 1 . The same issue arises in the other cases of Ta b l e 1 a s w ell, but the analysis is more complicated.
There is a basic tension that runs through the case law on patent infringement damages. It arises from the fact that there are two di erent objectives: to deny to the infringer the fruits of his illegal act, and to restore to the patentee the bene ts which he would have derived in the absence of infringement England v. Deere & Co., 221 F. Supp. 319, 1963. The legal doctrines of damages corresponding to these two objectives are unjust enrichment, and lost pro t reasonable royalty hereafter, reasonable royalty. The content of these doctrines has evolved over time, but the basic distinction remains. Prior to 1946, when the current statutory rules on damages took form, the courts appear to have given greater weight to unjust enrichment. During the post-war period the courts have relied exclusively on the reasonable royalty doctrine. In that doctrine, the sole basis for recovery is the patentee's damages and not the infringer's pro ts, though the latter may berelevant evidence for computing the patentee's actual damages or a reasonable royalty e.g., Zegers v. Zegers, Inc. 458 F.2d 726, 1972.
Unjust Enrichment: Under this doctrine, the patent owner is entitled to recover pro ts realized by the infringer on the theory that the infringer should not pro t from his wrongdoing. The infringer is viewed as holding these pro ts in constructive trust for the infringed party. In our model so far, where an infringer could not have developed the product without the patented research tool, the unjust enrichment i s v,c 2 . In Section 5 we reinterpret the concept of unjust enrichment for the case where a nonproprietary substitute is available.
Lost Pro t and Reasonable Royalty Under this doctrine, damages should restore the patentee to the condition that would have prevailed had the infringement not occurred. This shifts the focus from the infringer's pro ts to the patentee's foregone pro ts Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 1886. The doctrine as currently applied was enuncicated in Panduit Corp. v Stahlin Bros Fibre Works 575 F.2d 1152, 1978. The court stated that the patentee is entitled to recover actual damages also referred to as lost pro t or, when these cannot be proved, not less than a reasonable royalty. The principle is to restore the patentee to the position but for the infringement. Whether lost pro t is lost sales or lost licensing revenues depends on whether the owner would have developed the application himself or would have licensed to another rm. From an evidentiary point of view, this distinction would be hard for courts to assess. 10 However, in the case we analyze, where the research tool only earns pro t through licensing, lost pro t is lost licensing revenues. Hence it is the reasonable royalty measure of damages that applies.
Not surprisingly, despite judicial e orts to identify the relevant considerations in setting a reasonable royalty e.g., Georgia-Paci c Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 38 F. Supp. 1116, 1970, the doctrine has proved di cult to implement in a consistent and predictable manner Conley, 1987 . In this paper we make a stronger criticism: the doctrine involves a circularity, with the consequence that a whole range of damage measures d is logically consistent with it. Under the doctrine, damages d can bevery low, and licensing in the shadow of such damages might provide only weak incentives for developing research tools.
To see the circularity, recall that foregone pro ts are foregone licensing revenues. Our earlier analysis shows that rm 1's equilibrium pro ts are determined by the damages d. Firm 1's equilibrium pro t hence its lost pro t in the case of infringement is precisely d in the right branch of the tree in Figure 1 Remark 2. The unjust enrichment doctrine transfers the full surplus to the research tool owner. The reasonable royalty doctrine will not transfer the full surplus, except at the maximum damages d consistent with the doctrine.
Analysis of the Property Rule Injunctions
According to interviews with patent attorneys and in-house counsel in biotechnology rms, injunctions are an important instrument to enforce intellectual property rights on research tools. Those interviewed claimed that damages would be less e ective without the threat of injunctions. Injunctions encourage ex ante licensing and force ex post settlements when infringement occurs. Moreover, the interviewees recognized that the timing of injunctions a ects pro ts. Delays in requesting injunctions can shift pro ts to the owner of the research tool, since delay means that the infringer has sunk some of its cost by the time settlement occurs. However, they emphasized that discretion over strategic delay in seeking injunctions is severely limited by the doctrines of laches and estoppel. 11 We now examine how injunctions can be used to protect intellectual property on research tools. In the previous section we assumed that if no ex ante license is negotiated, the patentholder's remedies are i to develop the product, perhaps ine ciently, ii to allow infringement b y the second rm and collect damages ex post, or iii to engage in a perhaps ine cient patent race, followed by a damage payment if the second rm wins. We n o w assume that the patentholder can allow an infringing research program to begin, and then sue for an injunction. The bargaining positions for settlement after injunction are di erent than they would be for an ex ante license, before any research costs are sunk, or would be ex post, after the second patent has issued and all development costs have been sunk. We explore how injunctions a ect the rms' equilibrium pro t. For simplicity we analyze this question assuming that rm 2, but not the owner of the research tool, has the expertise to develop the subsequent product c 1 v c 2 . Figure 5 shows the order of decisions. As before, we assume that rm 1 will not o er an ex ante license if it knows that, absent the ex ante license, rm 2 will embark on a program of infringement. As we shall see, rm 2's willingness to begin investing without a license depends on how much delay will occur before the injunction and settlement.
In law, the defense of laches becomes available only after unreasonable delay by the patent owner in enforcing his rights see below. In the model, we capture this feature by assuming that the defense of laches can be invoked by rm 2 after it has sunk a portion That is, the patentholder is forced into a negotiation before rm 2 has sunk any costs, and this reduces his pro t.
The relationship between the patentholder's pro t and the severity of laches is summarized by the following proposition and Figure 6 . The previous proposition and corollary explain how the allowable delay under laches should be chosen in order to guarantee that the research tool owner appropriates the full surplus. In practice, the allowable delay is constrained both by h o w long it takes to discover infringement which, according to our interviews, may vary across industries and on how much additional delay the court allows under the doctrine of laches. In biotechnology, the owner of a research t o o l t ypically learns about infringement when the infringer conducts eld trials which typically begin about halfway in the development process. This sets a lower bound to the costs that the infringer has sunk before being enjoined from continuing.
To invoke the defense of laches, a defendant must show that the patentee unreasonably delayed enforcing his property right and that this caused him injury Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 391 F. Supp. 780, 1975 . In practice, the patentee has considerable latitude. However, the defense of laches is more likely to be granted by the courts if the infringer made signi cant i n vestments during the period of delay. 12 Moreover, in a series of recent cases, the courts have held that a delay of six years triggers a rebuttable presumption of laches, and shifts the burden of proof to the patentee to show that the defense of laches does not apply. 13 In addition to laches, an infringer may invoke the related defense of estoppel. Estoppel can beinvoked if the patent owner made representations by statements or conduct which implied that the patent w ould not be enforced, and if the defendant relied upon them and su ered injury as a result.
14 Unlike laches, a defense of estoppel does not require unreasonable delay by the patent owner, and can beinvoked at any time.
Patent Breadth and Alternative Research Tools
Our analysis so far has assumed that the research tool is the only vehicle for achieving the later product. For some research tools, such as a genetic sequence required to develop a medical therapy, this is so. For others, such as methods for inserting foreign genetic material into cells, there may exist nonproprietary substitutes. The threat points for ex ante licensing are now established by the option to use or develop a competing tool. We shall assume that the cost of developing or using the next best research tool is , and that the magnitude of is determined by the breadth of the patent on the research tool. We now show that our main conclusions also apply in this more general model. To do this we must reinterpret damages under the liability rule.
Firm 2 faces the choice of whether to obtain an ex ante license, and if not, then whether to infringe by using the research tool or to use the nonproprietary alternative. If he uses the alternative technology, he must pay a real cost of , and if he uses the patented research tool without an ex ante license, he must pay infringement damages ex post. The less costly of these determines the threat point for the ex ante agreement. Table 2 describes the case where the owner of the research tool does not have a capability t o i n vest in the product. The other cases, which depend on both rms' costs of developing the production, c 1 ; c 2 , a s w ell as the value v, are also summarized in the table. In Case 2, the second product is su ciently valuable v is su ciently high relative to the costs that both rms would race. If rm 2's strategy in the race is to infringe the rst patent, it must pay damages d if successful, so the expected damages are d=2. If rm 2's strategy is to use the nonproprietary alternative at cost , then it pays no damages ex post. Thus, rm 2 will infringe the proprietary technology in a race if and only if d 2 . The two rms' expected pro ts in the race are written as the threat points for Case 2.
Case 1 in
In Case 3, the value v is lower relative to costs than in Case 2, and there is only room for one rm in the race. Firm 1 would invest if v c 1 and rm 2 would invest if 22 v c 2 + minf ;dg. In Case 3, either rm would be willing to invest, assuming that the other did not. There are two equilibria, absent a n e x a n te agreement, only one of which is e cient.
The following lemma summarizes what we learn from Table 2 . The important implication is summarized in the proposition, namely that the existence of a nonproprietary alternative undermines the rst rm's pro t. The availability of a nonproprietary substitute changes the interpretation of both legal doctrines of damages. For the reasonable royalty doctrine, the circularity identi ed in Section 3 persists. Pro t, hence lost pro t, is lower when a substitute is available because the rst innovator's ex ante bargaining power is lower, reducing his licensing pro t in equilibrium. 
